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7These phenomena must be saying something to us – 
if only we could know exactly what.
S. Cohen1
Knowledge comes to us through a network of 
prejudices, opinions, innervations, self-corrections, 
presuppositions and exaggerations, in short through 
the dense, firmly-founded but by no means uniformly 
transparent medium of experience.
T. W. Adorno2
1. Introduction
The paper aims to think over what happens when the concepts 
we use within a specific discipline, such as sociology, cross 
the frontiers of the disciplinary discourse, coming to the public 
debate. The starting point deals with a news story implicating the 
catholic Church in a wide scandal. The sequence of events, and 
the ways institutions (such as media, political actors and church 
representative) construct representations of the scandal, become 
1 Cohen [2002, IV].
2 Adorno [2005, 80].
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the setting for putting some questions about the proximity between 
sociological concepts and those in the ordinary language. 
2. Loose boundary lines? Paedophile priests between moral 
panic and denial
During the 2010 spring, the catholic Church is involved in a 
scandal regarding paedophile priests. From then to now, accusations 
follow one another, assuming vast proportions and a wide international 
interest. News about old and new cases of abused minors arrive 
from Europe, North and South America, Africa and Australia. They 
increasingly involve, not only individual priests accused of abuses 
from the Sixties to the present day, but also the highest ecclesiastic 
hierarchies, who are blamed for hushing many of those episodes up 
during the past decades. The Church is accused of simply moving the 
most controversial priests to other dioceses, in the most sensational 
cases. Often, the presumed paedophiles are not reported and they 
never appear before a civil court to face their judgement. 
This issue provokes, as legitimate, a deep bewilderment all 
around the world. Progressively, testimonies from other victims 
add up to the reports. They start talking, maintaining that they were 
silent for a long time because of fear or shame. Especially during 
the first few months, the Church reacts by belittling the facts, in 
order to contrast the attacks directed towards it. The Avvenire, the 
newspaper from CEI - the Italian Episcopal Conference – reports 
the existence of a “moral panic lobby”, interested in throwing 
discredit on the Church, not to safeguard minors and victims of 
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the presumed abuses, but in order to reduce its authoritativeness 
on other “hot” issues debated on the public scene, such as end 
of life choices, abortion or homosexuals’ rights3. The term moral 
panic is evoked to signal that the news have been exploited and 
exaggerated in order to damage and «undermine the very heart 
of the Church». This is also supported by the second office of the 
Italian State, the President of the Senate Renato Schifani, on the 
occasion of his speech in the Vatican for the celebrations of the 
fifth anniversary of Pope Ratzinger’s election. 
The concept of moral panic is initially used quite frequently. 
The Church (and a representative of the Italian Government) adopt 
this as part of a strategy, also involving media4, aimed at limiting 
the relevance of the scandal. Altheide points out that «MP is 
often used defensively, or as a way to prevent or discourage over-
reaction» [2009, 90]. The catholic newspaper introduces moral 
panic exactly in this way, by highlighting the presence of «two 
characteristic elements: a real starting data and the exaggeration 
of this data by «doubtful moral entrepreneurs» [Introvigne 2010]. 
To support this thesis, the author of the article conveniently 
remembers that the issue of child abuse is one of the recurring 
topics readily associated with moral panic, together with youth’s 
violence, substances abuse or issues somehow related to sexuality. 
3 As Soukup has pointed out, the role of the media should also be considered as: «Journalists 
have helped bring about a convergence between religious scandals and media scandals» [1997, 
222].
4 Recent researches underline a changing relation between moral panic and the media because 
of a new plurality of media voices [David et al. 2011]. On this subject see also Lull, Hinerman 
[1997].
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At this point, the concept becomes part of the public debate. 
Following the emergence of the scandal, the accusation 
towards the Church is convalidated by a wide documentation 
gathered from various sources, also within the Church. This will 
tend to get amplified with an increase in reports in different world 
countries5 and, as time passes, moral panic will not be brought up 
when discussing the issue. The Church will adopt a progressively 
more cautious attitude, assuming partial responsibility of the 
events, as in pope Benedict’s XVI Pastoral Letter to the Irish 
Catholics, or during various public gatherings in summer 20106. 
The volatility in the use of this term seems to confirm an 
additional characteristic traditionally associated with the presence 
of moral panic: this is its sudden ability to appear and its quick 
dissolution7. Is it appropriate to use the concept of moral panic to 
describe the events?
5 As an example I quote the Murphy Commission Report. This Commission was founded in 2006 
to inquire on how the Church and the State Authorities deal with the reports of sexual abuses on mi-
nors perpetrated by priests in the Dublin diocese. This report makes explicit the aims of the Church 
on the events: «to keep the secret, to avoid the scandal, to protect the reputation of the Church, to 
preserve its goods» [in O’Toole 2010]. In 2003, the Archdiocese of Boston pays 85 millions of 
dollars in order to resolve 500 civil lawsuits on abuses on minors [O’Toole 2010]. Thanks to the 
inquiry carried out by some Boston Globe journalists, 200 out of the 1500 priests operating in the 
Archdiocese are accused of abuses. The record of extra-judicial agreements is, however, achieved 
by the Los Angeles Archdiocese which, in 2007, reaches an agreement for 660 millions of dollars, 
after having already paid 114 millions, for a total of 774 millions [data quoted from the mono-
graphic number of the periodical Malafede. Il lato oscuro della Chiesa, September 2010].
6 For instance, this is the content of the Homily in the Solemnity of the Holy Apostles Peter and 
Paul, held in the Vatican City on 30/06/2010, in which it can be read: «The church is mostly da-
maged by what defiles the faith and the Christian life of its members and communities, spoiling the 
integrity of the Mystical Body, weakening its prophecy and testimony capacity, dulling the beauty 
of its image» [Malafede, 2010, 30].
7 According to Cohen, the main elements which characterise moral panic are: 1) widespread 
feelings of concern; 2) hostility towards the actors who should face the problems; 3) diffused con 
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What is here at stake does not concern the contraposition 
between the experts on one side and those who circulate common 
sense on the other side. The controversy surrounding the meaning 
of a particular phenomenon is far from been solved with theory or 
within theory. On this subject, Howard Becker highlights that:
A first reason these quarrels over definitions are important is that the 
descriptive titles that embody these concepts are seldom neutral, but rather are 
terms of praise or blame [Becker, 129].
For instance, it is obvious that, in this case, to attribute or to deny 
foundation to the term moral panic, in order to account for the role 
of paedophile priests within the Church, involves two substantially 
opposite judgements on the conduct of the Ecclesiastic Institution. In 
the first instance – if moral panic is present – this means that exploitable 
and groundless attacks are taking place against the Church and its 
role; in the second instance – if the concept is quoted improperly 
– the role of “moral entrepreneur” covered by this institution in the 
society should be questioned in case of the presence of a widespread 
moral corruption within it. In the first case, the Church would require 
protection, in the second, it is society which should be safeguarded. 
In the latter case, the most appropriate concept to describe the 
situation could be, instead of moral panic, denial8 [Cohen, 2001]. 
sensus on the relevance of the problem and on the necessity to react; 4) disproportion between the 
perception of the gravity of the problem and the effective risk 5) volatility (with the same speed the 
problem arises and is subsequently set aside) [2002, XXII].
8 In a very recent paper, Cohen himself argues about new forms and features of these concepts, 
maintaining that: «Certain new moral panics can be understood as ‘anti-denial’ movements. The 
message is that denial – cover-up, evasion, normalization, turning a blind eye, tolerance, and so 
on – of certain social conditions, events and behaviours is morally wrong and politically irrational. 
Acknowledgement becomes the slogan. The previously denied realities must now be brought to 
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This could assume the shape of denial of the events (literal denial: 
nothing happened) or at least of their implications (interpretative 
denial: something happened but not what you describe). However, it 
is evident that this is not a small difference.
The event related to the accusations moved towards the 
Church is a good example of the route that some terms follow, 
passing from a precise disciplinary and historic context to transit 
in other discursive environments. This displacement, as previously 
argued, bears with it consequences on the relations between the 
involved actors and it poses various questions to the scholars, such 
as sociologists, interested in studying the representations of reality 
and the mechanisms which influence them. I intend to focus on 
this sort of “contamination” of meanings, during the transition 
from concepts used in the social sciences to their use in the public 
discourse. If it is agreed that sociology is a discipline founded on the 
empirical dimension, «aimed at facing social problems» [Bagnasco 
2007, 13], using concepts consistently with the assumptions which 
led to their creation, could be considered as part of sociologists’ 
responsibility. As I will describe, however, the question needs to 
be rephrased: in order to identify the transformations, which can 
be judged as more or less appropriate, of the concepts we use, we 
need to focus our attention not on the concepts per se, but on the 
social relationships behind their use.
public attention, their dangers exposed, their immorality denounced» [2011, 241]. For a review of 
the very recent debate about the concept of moral panic, see also the special issue of «Crime Media 
Culture» [2011], which steams from the conference Moral Panics in the Contemporary World, held 
at the Brunel University in December 2010, where also a first version of this paper was discussed.
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3. Ordinary versus sociological knowledge
The concept of moral panic is a good example that enables 
us to focus on some aspects of the relationship between sociology 
and common sense. Over the years and in different countries this 
stimulated a wide debate. This is also testified by the enduring 
attention about this concept and the subsequent developments, 
some decades after its initial formulations [Jenks 2011]. Altheide 
[2009] specifically highlighted how, during the past few years, the 
concept of moral panic has been widely used in many countries 
and in many arenas of discourse. This is true not only for the 
sociological literature – which, particularly focused its attention on 
the conditions which could favour its onset or on its exploitation for 
the achievement of social control – but also for the broader sphere 
of public discourses, for the media, and amongst them, especially 
for the newspapers. His analysis reconstructs «how moral panic 
has been used in the mass media in a way that is consistent with 
entertainment formats» [2009, 79] from the mid Eighties to 2007 
in the US and the UK. This shows «that the usage of moral panic 
increased since 1985» [ibidem, 83]. The debate around this concept 
specified its characteristics, making use of various contacts with 
empirical research. This also allowed a reflection on the meanings 
assumed by analogous concepts with the varying of the historical 
conditions of the contexts on which they have an impact.
It is possible to infer the vitality of a sociological concept 
from the debate it provokes within the scientific community and 
from the frequency with which it is used within the specialist 
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circles where it was formulated. Outside the specialist discourses, 
and especially for the concepts which are created within the 
heterogeneous totality of social sciences, those can spread more 
or less widely and become part of the public discourse assuming 
shapes which are not always congruent with the original meanings. 
During this transition, social concepts undergo transformations 
and become institutionalised within the public discourse and the so 
called ordinary knowledge. As Altheide describes, they pass «from 
more concept-specific usage to much broader and “looser” usage 
that assumes audience familiarity with the term» [2009, 84]. 
Thus, what is the nature of this familiarity? Firstly, in an 
attempt to comprehend the possibility that one single concept 
could be used to describe different phenomena, or that its use could 
create opposite evaluations of the phenomena which it is aimed 
at describing, it could be useful to focus on the role of concepts 
within the sociological discipline. Secondly, it could be helpful to 
go back and, starting from the example, ponder upon the different 
meanings assigned to moral panic within the public and ordinary 
knowledge discourses.
As a first thing, it is possible to stress that the proximity 
between sociological concepts and those used in the ordinary 
language has been used to criticise sociology and contextualise 
its irrelevance. Therefore, sociology has often been considered 
like «common sense wrapped up in somewhat unattractive 
jargon» [Giddens 1996, 3]. However, the same Giddens, in his 
book In Defence of Sociology, highlights how this proximity is 
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not necessarily indicative of a weakness within this discipline. On 
the contrary, contamination is somehow inevitable and it shows 
an almost indispensable interest of sociology for reality and its 
various interpretations. In fact, he argues that: 
There is, however, another, more subtle reason why sociology may 
appear quite often to proclaim what is obvious to common sense. This is that 
social research doesn’t, and can’t, remain separate from the social world it 
describes. Social world forms so much of our consciousness today that we 
take it for granted. […]. It is therefore to some degree the fate of sociology to 
be taken as less original and less central to our social existence than actually 
is. Not only empirical research but sociological theorizing and sociological 
concepts can become so much part of our everyday repertoire as to appear as 
“just common sense”. Many discuss moral panics or talk of someone’s social 
status – all notions that originated in sociological discourse [1996, 4].
In this perspective, ordinary knowledge appears as a sort of 
absorption/simplification of specialistic knowledge, which, during 
this transition, would acquire a state of obviousness. However, 
this is not always an obvious and linear process and the outcomes 
of this transition are not limited to confirming the meaning of 
those concepts. On this matter, I would like to quote Hans Zeisel’s 
considerations published in 1981 in a review of the volume Usable 
Knowledge by Charles Lindblom and David Cohen. The authors 
maintain that:
Ordinary Knowledge, owes its origins to «common sense, casual 
empiricism, or thoughtful speculation and analysis»[in Zeisel, 1981, 273].
The same Zeisel, in his considerations, agrees, in accordance 
with the authors, on the inevitability to turn to ordinary knowledge, as:
Living requires constant social problem solving. […] It is unreasonable 
16 17
to expect social science to play a preeminent role in this ocean of moment-to-
moment decision making [ibidem].
However, Zeisel also highlights how the relevance of the 
relationship between ordinary knowledge and social sciences 
knowledge is not equivalent to their necessary identification. This 
cannot even be used as a criterion to connote in a negative way 
concepts originated in the field of social sciences, as: «one of the 
more interesting functions of social research has been to correct 
ordinary knowledge when it is wrong» [ibidem]. On this regard, 
I report one of the research examples quoted by him. This shows 
how results produced by the two types of knowledge are not 
necessarily equivalent: 
As to head-on collisions between ordinary and scientific knowledge, Paul 
Lazarsfeld’s famous review of Samuel Stouffer’s The American Soldier comes 
to mind, in which he had some fun with the knowledge gained from “thoughtful 
speculation”. At the outset he notes that often the argument is advanced that 
surveys only put into complicated form observations that are already obvious to 
everyone. He than lists half a dozen convincing examples from The American 
Soldier and after a thoughtful discussion, asks, “Would it not be wiser to take 
[these insights] for granted and proceed directly to a more sophisticated type of 
analysis?” “This might be so,” he appears to agree, and then adds, “except for 
one interesting point about the list. Every one of these statements is the direct 
opposite of what actually was found [ibidem, 275].
Zeisel, by quoting Lazarsfeld’s considerations, pinpoints 
how proximity with common sense is not equivalent to assuming 
its point of view without criticism. Even if the concepts we use to 
build our lines of reasoning could be similar, the social sciences 
perspective is characterised by an approach which, time after time, 
investigates their consistency and appropriateness. In fact, our 
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only way to comprehend reality is to try to identify mechanisms 
subordinate to its functioning, turning to concepts which could 
help describe it with ideal typical models9 and their comparison. 
What kind of “tools” are the concepts we resort to?
In Tricks of the Trade, Howard Becker takes a stand in favour 
of concepts which are shaped and modified «in a continuous 
dialogue with empirical data» [1988, 109]. In fact, this operation 
is necessary in order to subject the concepts which we use to the 
rules of scientific procedure, which consist of verifying their 
scientific foundation and appropriateness time after time. However, 
even this attention involves operations which cannot be taken for 
granted. So, the concepts utilised in sociological research, do not 
identify shapes which can satisfy exhaustively the requirements 
of description:
That’s because we seldom define phenomena by one unambiguous 
criterion. We dont’say “If it has a trunk, it’s an elephant, and that’s that” or 
“If people exchange goods on the basis of price, that’s a market”. If we talked 
that way, we would know for sure whether a case was or wasn’t one of the 
things we were interested in. […] In the world we live in, however, phenomena 
seldom have all the attributes required for them to be, unambiguously, members 
of a class defined by multiple criteria. An organization has written files, and 
makes decisions by strict rules, but has no career paths for functionaries. It is a 
bureaucracy, or not? [ibidem, 128].
Thus, the ambiguous nature of concepts used to describe 
reality, firstly depends on an objective difficulty of defining the 
coordinates of the phenomena studied. Secondly it depends on the 
9 These consist: «of “a systematically related set of criteria surrounding a central issue” that is 
“sufficiently abstract to be applicable to a variety of national and historical circumstances» [Freid-
son 1994, 32, in Becker 1998, 109].
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difficulty to obtain criteria, which are at the same time wide enough 
to include its many facets and sufficiently precise to circumscribe 
some of its aspect for research purposes. 
Therefore, if we do not know exactly how social phenomena 
work, how can the consistency and the appropriateness of a 
description be judged? Charles Tilly focused his attention on 
the social implications of processes used to give reasons of the 
choices we perform. He highlights how «appropriateness and 
credibility vary from one social setting to another. Different pairs 
of givers and receivers therefore offer contrasting types of reasons 
for the same event» [2006, 21]. Tilly argues that this depends on 
different categories of reasons used according to the relationship 
between the speaker and the listener and on the different technical 
skills belonging to each one of the actors involved. Tilly identifies 
four different categories of reasons10. Two of them have close 
connections with the concept of moral panic and its uses. Those 
are stories and technical explanations. The first ones:
rework and simplify social processes so that the processes become 
available for the telling; […] they include strong imputations of responsibility, 
and thus lend themselves to moral evaluations: I get the credit, he gets the 
blame, they did us dirt. This second feature makes stories enormously valuable 
for evaluation after the fact, and helps account for people’s changing stories of 
events in which they behaved less than heroically [ibidem, 16].
Regarding technical explanations, as opposed to stories:
they combine cause-effect explanation (rather than logics of 
appropriateness) with grounding in some systematic specialised discipline 
(rather than everyday knowledge) [ibidem, 130].
10 Tilly [2006] differentiates between conventions, stories, codes and technical accounts.
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Thus, the distinction between who finds it is appropriate to 
use the concept of moral panic to describe the Church/paedophilia 
vicissitudes and who, on the contrary does not judge it as 
suitable, could depend on the different aims of the telling and, 
consequently, from using two different modalities to give reasons. 
When the Catholic Church argues that there is a very limited 
number of paedophile priests, it is attempting to build a coherent 
narrative, congruent with its aims. In this case, the aim of this 
institution is to present an image which will not discredit it in front 
of both believers and public opinion. The most important goal is 
the possibility to convince, rather that the absolute truth of the 
statements used. On the contrary, in technical explanations, there 
is an interest in connecting as much as possible the reasoning with 
a precise presentation of data. Researchers tend to (or at least they 
should) pay increased attention to the way in which the concept 
helps describing some aspects of reality, rather than its capacity to 
convince.
The difference can be specified by quoting another example, 
regarding a different topic frequently discussed by public opinion 
in relation to moral panic. In discussions about migratory 
phenomena, when the necessity of decreasing migratory fluxes 
is maintained because of political aims, usually, stories are used 
more than technical explanations. The reason could be that 
stories can more easily take advantage of fears diffused among 
the population [Altheide 2002; Maneri 1991]. Scientific work 
and technical explanations should rely on a more precise way of 
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using data on the possible increase in migratory fluxes. Their aim 
should not be acquiring consensus but the necessity of a careful 
and updated documentation of the empirical evidences of the 
phenomenon, which will subsequently be submitted to the public 
debate. However Boudon pinpoints: 
The media are more drawn to sociological products likely to meet a 
demand from their audience than sociological products with a cognitive 
function [2002, 376].
In real terms, those two modalities of giving reasons are not 
always separated and often narrations become part of the practices 
used by scholars. Those are not always estranged from the logics of 
political debates and consensus in the name of abstract ideals, bound 
to a superior analytic need, far from reality and its implications. 
In fact, stories have an increased power to appear convincing, 
compared to technical explanations. This is so because they are built 
with the intention to reach a wide and non-specialised audience, 
stimulating emotions. Moreover they are difficult to oppose for 
those who try to utilise sources and information more adequately, 
for instance for disciplinary reasons. However, it is important to 
be aware that trying to contrast stories by resorting to technical 
explanations could not be successful from the communication 
point of view, also because of the relational nature of concepts 
and meanings that those could assume, depending on the different 
audiences to whom they are addressed.
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4. On the relational dimensions of the moral panic concept 
and its use in the example offered
At this stage, it should be clear that difficulties we meet when 
trying to define the reality around us depend, mostly, not as much (or 
not only) from subjective or disciplinary limitations, but also from 
the multidimensional nature of the phenomena observed and from 
the aims pursued by each actor (such as journalists and scholars). 
The more general complications regard the relationship between 
concepts originated in the social sciences circles and society as a 
whole. It is possible to pinpoint some more elements through an 
exploration of the specific characteristics of the concept we are 
working on, especially regarding the multiplicity of the relational 
aspects which are implied in its use. The relational dimension, 
besides allowing us to specify the articulation of the concept, 
permits us – as I will try to demonstrate in the conclusion – to 
prefigure a possible way to get out of the dead end about the scholars’ 
responsibility on its use and the plurality of its meanings.
The concept of moral panic, as many other concepts, assumes 
a relational dimension which can be articulated on different levels. 
The first one deals with the relationship between context and 
scholars at the moment in which it was originally formulated. 
Garland highlights that this concept begins to take shape in a 
historic moment characterised by a widespread attention to social 
control elements found in society:
As Cohen points out in his introduction to the third edition of Folk 
Devils and Moral Panics (2002), the term “moral panic” emerged from late 
1960s social reaction theory, especially the concern with the media’s role 
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in stereotyping and misrepresenting deviance and the perception that such 
reporting might contribute to a deviancy amplification spiral. […] In the face 
of what they regarded as uniformed, intolerant, and unnecessarily repressive 
reaction to deviance by conservative authorities, these sociologists developed 
a standard critical response, a critique with which to counter oppressive social 
reaction [2009, 19].
The concept was born as a counter-narrative11 to shift, from 
the mid Eighties, «to a news narrative that includes opposition 
or “other-side” views, and it’s incorporated within news formats 
(e.g. editorials and op-eds) that are dedicated to offering different 
views on certain topics» [Altheide 2009, 81]. In the concrete 
case here described, the narration shift does not concern so much 
newspapers, which still amplify its significance and which still 
take advantage of the dynamics triggered when it is evoked. 
In fact, it involves especially the role of some representatives 
of government elites and of the same Church. This process of 
recontextualization [Bernstein 1990, 60, in Iedema e Wodak 2009, 
13] definitely shifts the focus of attention on power and on how 
this takes shape through the narratives produced and circulated. 
Therefore, this second relational dimension could be defined as 
the power to redefine reality. 
In the case here observed, a difference which deserves 
attention is that the presumed activation of panic was reported by 
the Church, one of the largest international institutions, not by an 
underprivileged group or by someone trying to defend it. Moral 
11 As Cohen points out in his introduction to the third edition: «Folk Devils and Moral Pani-
cs was informed by the sixties fusion of labelling theory, cultural politics and critical sociology. 
Today’s students of moral panic do not have to engage with this theoretical mix-up. They can go 
straight into the literature on social constructionism and claims-making» [2002, XXII].
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panic, initially used as a weapon against those who hold the power 
of labelling the deviants in order to reveal their plots, was used 
here by representatives of powerful groups in order to defend their 
status quo. 
The last relational dimension concerns the issue defined by 
Garland in terms of «ethics of attribution, that shapes the use of 
the term, and occasionally restrains analysts from applying it» 
[2009, 24]. Let us see what it is meant by this expression:
There may be situations in which the empirical conditions seem to invite 
“moral panic” analysis but where ethical considerations make the attribution 
seem tactless, morally insensitive, or otherwise inappropriate [ibidem].
This scholar points out how, the reaction which developed 
following the 9/11 events12, could have explicitly addressed this 
concept: 
This was an episode of social reaction that seems clearly to meet the 
criteria of a moral panic attribution – exhibiting concern, hostility, consensus, 
disproportionality, and volatility, as well as a definite moral dimension and a 
sense that a way of life is being threatened – and yet there is a definite reluctance 
to describe this episode as involving a moral panic [ibidem].
However, this attribution is (at least partially) possible only 
after six years from the events.
Now that emotions have cooled, and fears receded, analytical skepticism 
seems more feasible, although many still regard it as scandalous and irresponsible 
[ibidem, 25].
The three aspects which connote the relational dimension 
12 About the role of the media behind the growth of dramatization in presenting the news, see 
also Ekström and Johansson [2008]; Monahan [2010].
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of the concept can thus be defined as: the cultural contest of its 
original formulation, the power dynamics between the actors 
involved in defining the situation, and the ethics of appropriateness 
in regard to the historical moment. They allow us to focus on the 
dynamic nature of definitions and permit to somehow rephrase 
the question from which we started. Dealing with the normative 
aspects of moral panics:
When someone describes an episode as a moral panic, it’s always 
possible to suppose that he or she is simply refusing to take seriously the moral 
viewpoint of those who are alarmed. What the analyst sees as a hysterical 
overreaction may be seen by the participants as an appropriate response to a 
deeply moral evil [Garland 2009, 22]
Can the sociologist be held responsible for the way in 
which the meanings of a particular concept are defined? At this 
point, it should be clear that, in the presence of such complex and 
changeable conditions, the question appears out of place. However, 
the sociologist’s responsibility does not dissolve and, how I argue 
in the final considerations, it requires to be redefined, shifting its 
focus from the meanings as such to the conditions which could 
allow to publicly question them. 
5. Conclusions
Even though external conditions13 seem to reduce 
sociologists’ responsibility in the diffusion of their concepts 
outside of the disciplinary sphere, it should be possible to recover 
13 Such as the speed of circulation of the information, in ways which would have been incon-
ceivable even in the recent past, which prevents control over the diffusion of well-grounded and 
reliable contents.
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our responsibility by trying to redefine it. I mean that, on the one 
hand, it is neither possible, in the age in which we are living, to 
keep under control the proliferation of meanings produced nor to 
ascribe to science a thaumaturgic power which it did not show 
to hold14. On the other hand, it is necessary to contribute to the 
development of sociology not in a self-referential way, by being 
open about the possibility to rethink and rephrase the concepts we 
use, paying attention to the way in which they are understood and 
applied in a constantly redefined reality. As the words contribute to 
the construction of the reality around us, it appears as increasingly 
necessary to set up spaces and occasions in which to publicly 
discuss15. This does not imply disinterestedness or unawareness 
about the effects produced when the categories used spread 
around the world. For instance, when Cohen [2002] identified the 
discourses on welfare frauds as one of the seven typical spheres16 
which characterise the diffusion of moral panic within society, 
he was also interested in finding a possible connection with the 
subsequently produced events. The amplification of a climate 
of mistrust towards the protection system, mainly by the media, 
14 Discussing how the social sciences are taken into consideration and their role in the present 
day society is obviously a broad topic and is beyond the aim of this paper. However I will quote 
a consideration by Giddens on this regard, as he identifies in the image of the natural sciences a 
normative ideal to whom social sciences often conform: «I do not think you could find a single 
reputable philosopher of science who believes any longer in the conception of natural science 
to which many social scientists aspired. Natural science, as it clearly demonstrated in the post-
Kuhnian philosophy of science, is a hermeneutic or interpretative endeavour. […] The framing of 
meaning is actually more fundamental than the discovery of laws» [1998, 68].
15 On the role of public debate for democracy, see also Sen [2009].
16 These typically concern juvenile violence, school violence, drugs, child abuse, sex and vio-
lence, welfare cheats and single mothers, refugee and asylum seekers.
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was – according to the author – functional to the heavy cuts on 
the protection system made by Thatcher during the Eighties. 
The scholar’s attention – as Cohen does throughout his 
work – has to be focused on the understanding of processes and 
mechanisms which determine them. The decision to carry out 
reporting or contrasting politically the phenomena in action, can 
be performed in another capacity, as a citizen. Moreover, Becker 
argues that, in order to understand the relevance of a statement, it 
is appropriate to study the social conditions that made it possible, 
the situation in which a specific category is addressed, which 
problems belong to the group who typically uses it: 
One thing you don’t do is try to decide what it really is, whatever “it” 
is. That’s not a social scientist’s business, although many social scientists 
have thought it was; our business is to watch others try to enforce the ban of 
something from some prized category, not to decide whether the ban is justified 
[ibidem 1998, 158].
In this perspective, a “badly used” concept could be as useful 
as one “used correctly”, as long as a dialectic between positions 
and interpretations is possible. This dialectic allows the knowledge 
of the world to become stronger. For this reason it is incorrect to 
circumscribe the accepted meanings and it is important to extend 
the discussion on the social conditions which made them possible. 
A concept which leads us in this direction, such as moral panic, 
is a good one, as it can allow us to move some steps towards 
the process of knowledge of reality, as long as it is capable of 
stimulating well grounded discussions and that it is possible 
to work on constructing the social conditions that foster them. 
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If the choice of categories produces undeniable repercussions 
on the way in which problems are shaped and faced, the aim 
and the responsibility of sociology should concentrate on the 
reconstruction of the mechanisms by which those effects are 
produced. For instance, this is the case of the shapes which can 
be assumed by the context or of the way in which individuals 
consider themselves or are considered by others. Gloria Regonini, 
an Italian scholar interested in public policies and in the processes 
which lead to their definitions, highlights that: «what makes the 
difference is not the realism of assumptions, but their ability to 
activate probes capable of entering processes otherwise excluded» 
[Regonini, 2001, 407]. Thus, it becomes necessary to locate some 
practice-oriented ways out, which could help defining empirically-
grounded analysis and reflections on the categories used. Firstly, 
the experimentation allows us to formulate provisional truths and 
thus «reversible and challengeable on the basis of new beliefs or 
new coalitions» [ibidem, 237]. Secondly, the learning requires a 
constant monitoring of the choices and consequences which those 
determine [ibidem, 238]. The third way out is reflectivity. This 
deals with the awareness that each point of view is biased and with 
the consequent possibility to «look from different perspectives at 
the situation in which [the analyst] is involved» [ibidem, 242].
As Foucault, which dedicated a large part of his activity as 
scholar to reconstruct historical-social meanings associated to the 
practices and concepts which are implied, argued:
Given a certain problematization, you can only understand why this kind 
of answer appears as a reply to some concrete and specific aspect of the world. 
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There is the relation of though and reality in the process of problematization. 
And that is the reason why I think that it is possible to give an answer - the 
original, specific, and singular answer of thought- to a certain situation. And it 
is this kind of specific relation between truth and reality which I tried to analyze 
[1985]17.
17 The six lectures were delivered on the UC Berkeley Campus in October and November 
of 1983. See accompanying print transcript: Foucault, M. Fearless speech. Ed. Pearson, Jo-
seph. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e),  2001. UC Berkeley holdings: BJ1421.F68 2001 MAIN. 
Online transcript available from: http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/foucault.DT6.conclu-
sion.en.html.
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